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By the year 2000, Islamism will be approximately a quar-
ter of a century old. This movement, though it claimed
deep roots, surfaced and flourished with the major social
breakdown which took place in the mid 1970s in the
Muslim world. Twenty-five years later, social sciences Ð
provided they take stock Ð have the opportunity to make
a significant breakthrough in the analyses of what was
one of the most puzzling Ð if unexpected Ð social phe-
nomena of the contemporary period.
The Political
S o c i o l o g y
of Islamism
A quarter of a century covers the span of a
generation. Activists who were in their twen-
ties in the mid 1970s, on Egyptian, Pakistani or
Indonesian campuses, are now middle-aged.
Their black beards are turning barley and corn.
They chanted slogans and forwarded the
utopia of the daoula islamiyya, the Islamist
state. As for now, for better or worse, they have
a record. They are established, part of the polit-
ical game. Some are in power Ð where they dis-
tribute patronage Ð, others are in jail, some
dead, others in exile in the impious lands of the
West Ð to which they have an intimate expo-
sure Ð, and many are in business. In some
cases, their world-view has changed. And they
have children. The new generation which is
coming of adult age in the 1990s has no mem-
ories of the fights of the late seventies and
early eighties Ð the Iranian revolution, SadatÕs
assassination, etc. Ð just like the activists of the
seventies were foreign to their own parentsÕ
stories: the struggle against colonialism, the
battles for independence, and everything that
had taken place from the middle forties to the
early sixties. The young Islamists of yesterday
had built their vision and mobilized their fol-
lowers to a large extent as a reaction to the sta-
tus quo of their time Ð which they described in
categories of thought and speech which were
grounded in Islamic parlance but adapted to
the social, political, cultural and economic con-
ditions of those days. To what extent are they
still relevant for the young adults of the year
2000? The 1997 presidential election in Iran
gave advance notice that a majority of the chil-
dren of the Islamic republic were willing to
oust the incumbents. In Turkey, Refah PartisiÕs
short-lived venture in government showed
that Mr Erbakan and his friends could not engi-
neer enough social pressure to remain in
power. Egyptian and Algerian Islamist move-
ments, in spite of their wide following, were
unable to topple the State, and could not help
their splitting up into competing splinter
groups: the violence and terrorism of the
extremist factions blurred the accomodationist
message of the mainstream organizations.
These and a few other examples should help
us understand that Islamism is not the tidal
wave that its supporters longed for and its
opponents dreaded. It is by no means the End
of History of the Muslim world today. It is but a
social movement like any other Ð communism,
nationalism, liberalism, fascism, socialism, É Ð
which is subject to ebbing and flowing, to inter-
nal contradictions, and it has to compete fierce-
ly with other social movements in order to
attract and mobilize followers. Twenty-five
years ago it was a new issue: today, it is no
longer so, and we have to consider post-
I s l a m i s m .
A quarter of a century of existence provides a
lot of data, and allows for comparative analysis
Ð something which was hardly feasible for
those of us who engaged in early studies of the
phenomenon by 1980. Then, the task of the
social scientist who tackled such a topic was to
be an eye-opener, to uncover the significance
of Islamist movements Ð in contradistinction to
the p r  n o t i o n s or the common wisdom of the
social sciences discourse of the times, that dis-
carded them as insignificant, epiphenomenal,
reactionary, fascist, and the like. During this
pioneering stage, each of us was discovering
his own field, and we had very little access to
comparison, because social science literature
was scant. As a new phenomenon, it did not
bring with it much historical depth: it could be
put into perspective with earlier movements Ð
such as the Egyptian Muslim Brothers for
instance Ð but the social environments of
British-controlled and independent Egypt
were worlds apart. It could be related to intel-
lectual history Ð such as the Ïuvre of Sayyid
Qotb Ð but ideology was by no means a surro-
gate for political sociology. For the few who
took the movement seriously at its onset, it
was fascinating Ð all the more so because it
provided for an ÔindigenousÕ conceptual lan-
guage that seemed to reveal the malfunctions
of society, that had a tribune tone. But we were
not equipped at the time to analyse the move-
ment in terms of political sociology, to evalu-
ate its relation, as an object, to the field to
which it belonged. Hence, we focused on what
was at hand and expedient Ð on discourse and
m i l i t a n c y .
Since then, the environment of the research
on Islamism has undergone a sea change.
Scarcity was replaced by hypertrophy. Many
valuable studies (and many less valuable) were
published, and their first and foremost asset
was to provide grounds for comparison. It is
outside the scope of one individual, even of a
team of scholars, to cover an array of move-
ments that function in so many different soci-
eties and use so many different idioms. Field-
work research is now available on Islamism in
China; Southeast, South and Central Asia; Iran;
Turkey; Africa; the Arab world; Europe; and
America. To take but one example, students of
the Arab world, who rarely know Urdu, had to
rely on hearsay when it came to Mawdudi and
the jamaat-e Islami: now that we have S.V.
NasrÕs superb scholarship, not only can our
knowledge per se of that ideologue and his
organization make a leap forward, but it also
brings invaluable food for thought when one
embarks on a study of FIS or R e f a h. Hence, the
challenge of the social sciences has changed:
though there always will be a lot more to dis-
cover, much has been done in terms of
description and inventory of Islamist move-
ments as an object of research. What remains
in front of us is the study of the interaction
between such an object and the social field in
which it functions. In other words, the political
sociology of Islamism is now the continent to
be explored.
One of the difficulties of this task is due to
the extremely politicized aspect of the majori-
ty of the literature which is produced on
Islamism, and the strong normative pressure
which is exerted on scholars to take sides Ð
something that blurs the very process of
research. To some extent, the present situation
is comparable to studies of communism in the
post World War II period, when specialized
scholars were caught between the hammer of
the fellow traveller and the anvil of the social
traitor. Nowadays, one is torn between apolo-
gists and enemies. Both groups are backed by
powerful, well-funded interest groups and
foundations, control research centres, univer-
sity chairs, journals, and the like, particularly in
the United States. When one does not want to
enrol in either camp, financial resources
become scarce. Both apologists and enemies
share one basic assumption: Islamist move-
ments as they view them are representative of
Muslim societies today. Either they are alto-
gether Ôbad guysÕ, hostile to the West, and
should be contained; Or they are mainly Ôgood
guysÕ Ð except for a few ÔextremistsÕ Ð with no
hostility to market forces, and they should be
co-opted into power. An increasing amount of
the social sciences literature on Islamism is
now being produced in order to reinforce
either of these two normative views.
The risk here is to jump to conclusions and to
miss the object of research Ð to confuse the
representation of Islamist movements with
their reality. All the more so as the movements
themselves contribute to this process of repre-
sentation as they produce a lot of discourse,
which is self-promoting. Some is aimed at the
West, some at local bases of support. Some is
replete with s a l a m, some with j i h a d. Twenty
years ago, when nothing was available but dis-
course and militancy, we had to take discourse
very seriously. Nowadays, with a quarter of a
century of social history of Islamism, we should
start with facts, and consider discourse as part
and parcel of the political process, not as a key
to its understanding.
One very simple starting point, for those con-
vinced that it is now time to take stock, would
be to look back at the divergent fates of Islamist
movements in the many countries where they
have emerged Ð and for which there is serious
monographic research available. How is it that
they have been successful in some cases, man-
aged to seize power, have failed in others, were
unable to resist state repression and/or to
mobilize wide enough a constituency? Com-
parative data now allow researchers to find
new evidence on the social cluster that com-
poses Islamist movements: everywhere, they
brought together different social groups with
diverging agendas, which could remain united
under certain circumstances, but whose
alliance could break under other circum-
stances. If one compares the movements of
Iran and Algeria, for instance, one of the keys to
understanding why they succeeded in seizing
power in one case and failed in the other lies in
the interaction between the pious middle-
classes, the young urban poor and the Islamist
intelligentsia in each society. In Iran, Khomeini
managed to control the whole mobilization
process and keep all groups united until the
outcome of the revolution. In Algeria, the FIS
was able to mobilize side by side the h i t t i s t e s
and the goldsmiths during the early phases,
from 1989 to 1991, but it was incapable (lately)
to prevent the splitting of the ranks between
the pious middle-classes and the young disen-
franchised Ð something which hampered its
capacity to seize power, and then to resist
repression. Such phenomena should lead us to
be more aware of the social composition of the
Islamist parties, and of the relevance of social
factors to their capacity for mobilization Ð
whether it be in the case of Refah Partisi, of
JamaÕat-e Islami and the other Pakistani reli-
gious parties, of the Arab Muslim Brothers
organizations and their rivals within the politi-
cal Islamic field, of ICMI and the Muham-
madiyya in Indonesia, etc. To what segments in
contemporary Muslim societies do those move-
ments eventually deliver, and what do they
actually deliver Ð particularly when they have
partial or hegemonic access to power? And,
conversely, which are the social groups that
feel deprived, or ill-treated by them?
A quarter of a century should have been long
enough for social scientists to dispel their fas-
cination for the mystique of contemporary
Islamism: it is now high time for scholars to
treat it like any other social object Ð something
which may well, in turn, shed more light on our
understanding of the social use of religion on
the eve of the twenty-first century. '
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